Abdulsalami: We Adopted 1979 Constitution To Ward Off Military Hawks Who Didn’t Want To Leave Power
General Abdulsalami Abubakar says 1979 constitution was adopted to prevent military hawks who were resisting handing over power to civilians.
General Abdulsalami Abubakar says 1979 constitution was adopted to prevent military hawks who were resisting handing over power to civilians.
Former Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar (rtd), has revealed that Nigeria’s military rulers could have extended the country’s transition to democratic rule in 1999 by an additional three years in order to draft a completely new constitution.
Abdulsalami made the disclosure in his autobiography, Call of Duty, where he also detailed the intense debates within the military and political establishment following the death of General Sani Abacha in 1998, and the options that were considered before Nigeria’s eventual return to civilian rule in 1999.
He said some “hawks” within the military were in favour of prolonging military rule, but insisted that a swift transition was the best path to avoid political instability and possible authoritarian entrenchment.
Following a nationwide consultation coordinated by a 25-member Constitution Debate Co-ordinating Committee (CDCC), chaired by Justice Niki Tobi, Nigerians reportedly leaned towards adopting the 1979 Constitution with amendments drawn from the 1995 draft constitution.
Presenting the committee’s findings to Abdulsalami in 1998, Justice Tobi said:
“In the light of the memoranda and the oral presentation on the 1995 Draft Constitution, it is clear that Nigerians basically opt for the 1979 Constitution with relevant amendments. Putting it in another language, the common denominator in the mouths of Nigerians the world over is the 1979 Constitution with relevant amendments. They want it, and they have copiously given their reasons for their choice in the different memoranda and oral presentations. So, we have recommended to the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) the adoption of the 1979 Constitution with relevant amendments from the 1995 Draft Constitution.”
Abdulsalami said the recommendation came as a relief, noting that adopting the controversial 1995 draft wholesale could have triggered renewed political tensions.
“I must confess that was a welcome relief to me. Adopting the Draft Constitution wholesale would definitely be opposed by the Afenifere/NADECO bloc, which never wanted to have anything to do with Abacha. There was the real danger that we could go into another phase of crisis over that. For someone who wanted to get the transition programme done with as quickly as possible, I was quite comfortable with the option of adopting the 1979 Constitution.”
Abdulsalami, who assumed office on June 8, 1998 following Abacha’s death, said he was confronted with several possible transition paths.
He explained that he could have continued Abacha’s transition programme, which would have seen elections held and a handover by October 1, 1998. However, he said the political environment made that option unrealistic.
“When Abacha died and I succeeded him, I had several options before me. I could choose to continue with his transition programme and that would mean organising the governorship and presidential elections and handing over power on 1 October 1998. But this had downsides. The five political parties, which the late Chief Bola Ige, former Governor of the old Oyo State, famously described as the ‘five fingers of a leprous hand’, lacked credibility. They were perceived as playthings in the hands of Abacha and they too did not cover themselves in glory when they nominated him as their presidential candidate even though he was neither their member nor legally allowed to be so adopted.”
He added that exclusion of key political actors from the South-West and pro-democracy movement also made the plan untenable.
“Worse still, the mainstream South-West political establishment, which had opposed Abacha’s government, would not buy into this option. It was impossible to resolve the political crisis by keeping out June 12 activists and respected politicians who campaigned vigorously for a return to credible democracy. Many of these politicians did not belong to any of the five parties. Therefore, going ahead with Abacha’s programme would automatically exclude some of the best brains in the country.”
He also criticised the secrecy surrounding the 1995 draft constitution.
“This option was also hindered by a basic challenge: the Draft 1995 Constitution was in limbo. The Abacha Administration had not made the draft public and most Nigerians were left guessing the form of government to be enthroned on 1 October 1998. The draft contained several provisions that were new to Nigeria. There was a provision for multiple Vice-Presidents, a Prime Minister and a Deputy Prime Minister. There were several other new provisions that amounted to sailing in uncharted waters.”
Abdulsalami said another option was to abandon Abacha’s programme entirely and begin a fresh transition process, but warned that such a move would likely prolong military rule.
“There was a second option: discard the Abacha transition programme entirely and start from scratch. That would mean setting up another Constitutional Conference and rolling out another transition programme. If we chose this option, it could keep the Military in power for as many as three years. For those who wanted the Military to stay longer, this was their choice. It would allow us to buy time by creating a public debate for one year, setting up a conference that would sit for another one year to write a new constitution, and then releasing a timetable that would run for another year, taking us to at least 2001.”
He said he rejected this approach because of the risk of entrenched military rule.
“This option was fraught with dangers. Clearly, I did not have any intention of prolonging my stay in office. I was not even tempted. People were already whispering to me that I did not need to rush a handover, that a lot of work needed to be done to put our democracy on sound footing. While I did not disagree with them on the need to take time to lay a solid foundation, my stand was that there was never a perfect time. Democracy is not achieved in one day. Plant the seed and it will keep growing if the players are committed to watering it.”
He warned that delay could embolden military hardliners.
“I reasoned that the longer the Military stayed in power after Abacha’s death, the bleaker the prospects of a genuine transition to democracy would be. There were military officers who had tasted political power and were not too willing to let go. If I prolonged the transition programme under the desire to create a perfect democracy with a perfect Constitution, I would only be giving room to the hawks in the Military to hold on to power. I could not even rule out the possibility of a coup along the line by officers who did not want the Military to quit. For me, the earlier we left, the better for the democratisation project.”
