Ebola vigil at Nigerian airports falters under scrutiny

…No visible checks at Abuja Int’l arrival terminals despite FAAN’s surveillance assurance

Nigeria stands at the risk of a second wave of the Bundibugyo strain of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) if the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) fail to aggressively intensify surveillance, mandatory screenings, and quarantines at the nation’s gateways at all ports of entry and exit of the West African nation.

The airport authority, FAAN, has made numerous assurances to this effect; however, operations at departure terminals are proceeding largely as normal, with glaring gaps in pre-flight screening. This situation is near critical, understanding that the continent is under the threat of a broader epidemic, either arising from the fast spreading Ebola or Hantavirus, which is being monitored in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

BusinessDay’s findings at both the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport (NAIA) in Abuja and the Murtala Muhammed International Airport (MMIA) Terminal 2 in Lagos revealed a stark contrast between official public health directives and on-the-ground execution.

While arriving international passengers face functional containment bottlenecks, departing travellers are passing through standard security channels with no visible health surveillance or Ebola-related checks.

The lax operating environment comes amid a recent classification by the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC), which recently rated the risk of Ebola Virus Disease importation as “high.”

Public health anxiety is driven by a fast-moving outbreak of the rare Bundibugyo strain across the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda, which has already claimed over 220 lives out of nearly 1,000 suspected cases.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) warns that this specific strain is outpacing local response efforts due to the complete absence of approved vaccines or licensed therapeutics.

In Lagos, a physical check of the MMIA Terminal 2 departure hall on Wednesday morning revealed a total absence of Port Health Services or NCDC personnel. Intending passengers cleared check-in counters freely without temperature monitoring or health declarations.

Sarah Jacob, an international passenger travelling via EgyptAir, expressed surprise at the lack of baseline pre-departure profiling.

“There were no health questionnaires detailing recent travel history or potential exposure to the virus,” Jacob told BusinessDay. “In other countries I’ve visited recently, intending travellers are legally required to declare their travel histories before boarding. I am surprised that in Nigeria, there is still nothing like that in place for departures.”

This loose infrastructure was mirrored in Abuja, where airline personnel confirmed that boarding clearance was moving forward without special biosecurity interventions.

“This is totally different from the COVID-19 pandemic when a lot of equipment was deployed, and passengers had to undergo multi-layered checks before flying; we are not doing anything different now,” an airline staff member told BusinessDay on condition of anonymity. “There is no health worker on the ground, and I have not seen any heightened surveillance lately.”

However, the protocol changes significantly at the international arrival wings. Arriving passengers at MMIA confirmed that Port Health teams are actively operating non-contact temperature checks.

“We were screened with temperature checks immediately upon arrival,” a passenger arriving on a Kenya Airways flight stated. “We were also mandated to complete a comprehensive health form detailing our recent transit history to map potential exposure. It was a straightforward, orderly queue.”

The observed gaps at departure gates stand in sharp contrast to recent institutional declarations.

Henry Agbebire, Director of Public Affairs & Consumer Protection at FAAN, had earlier maintained that the authority has fortified its defensive lines in tandem with sister health agencies.

“FAAN has put in place robust preventive measures across all international airports to curb any potential cross-border transmission of the disease,” Agbebire stated.

“In collaboration with Port Health Services and the NCDC, we have intensified passenger surveillance, particularly for travellers arriving from high-risk regions. Passengers are being screened for symptoms associated with Ebola, and any suspected case will be promptly isolated and subjected to secondary medical evaluations.”

Agbebire added that behind-the-scenes staff sensitisation, emergency coordination channels, and stakeholder communication have been reinforced. “While there is currently no confirmed case of Ebola in Nigeria, FAAN remains vigilant and fully committed to safeguarding public health,” he added.

Standard global aviation protocols for handling severe viral outbreaks rely on multi-layered biosecurity. In ideal public health systems, frontline defense structures are highly systematised.

Nigeria’s vulnerability to imported pathogens is historically documented. The country recorded its index case of Ebola on July 20, 2014, when Patrick Sawyer, an infected Liberian-American diplomat, flew into the Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos.

Sawyer’s arrival triggered a national public health emergency that resulted in 20 cases across Lagos and Rivers states, claiming eight lives—including heroic frontline health workers—before the WHO declared the country Ebola-free on October 20, 2014.

Public health experts warn that the lessons of 2014 and the recent COVID-19 pandemic are being undermined by reactive policymaking.

Adaobi Onyechi, a Lagos-based public health analyst, warned that the lack of departure screening and loose subnational surveillance leaves the country highly exposed.

“Ebola anywhere in Central or East Africa is an immediate threat to Nigeria because of dense regional travel and trade links,” Onyechi cautioned.

“The immediate concern with the Bundibugyo strain is that there is no licensed vaccine or therapy, which severely limits clinical options if a case slips through. Outbreak preparedness in Nigeria is too often reactive; we pay attention only when an emergency lands on our doorstep.”

Onyechi further noted that early Ebola symptoms closely mimic endemic illnesses like malaria and typhoid.

“If frontline airport screeners and hospital workers are not hyper-vigilant, an imported case can circulate within urban centres for days before detection. Early catching is everything with Ebola; any delay exponentially multiplies the transmission chain.”

Echoing these concerns, Adetolu Ademujimi, a public health expert at APIN Public Health Initiatives, urged the immediate retraining of airport workers and frontline clinical staff on rapid emergency response frameworks.

He stressed that Nigeria’s past containment successes should not become a justification for current complacency.